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This publication is part of a project funded by the 
??? ???????????????? ?? ??????
3My assignment was to study the Arms Registration and 
Marking (ARM) program and the work on Community 
Security and Arms Control (CSAC) and make sugges-
tions for greater effectiveness. My report has mostly 
focused on the ARM program.
The government of Sudan has launched an 
effort to mark and register weapons held by tribes in 
Darfur, relying on the voluntary cooperation of native 
administrators and tribal leaders. Germany and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are 
supporting this venture with technical advice and 
equipment. Additionally, UNDP is carrying out activi-
ties on the ground to support ARM directly, and also 
?????? ??? ?????? ???????????????? ?????????????????
ects that create an enabling environment for ARM. 
The Sudanese police are also helping to carry out 
ARM. However, the ARM program has no money for 
operational expenses. I recommend that the Suda-
nese government provide funds for this purpose.
In my opinion, the ARM approach makes sense 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
????????? ? ? ?? ???? ?? ????? ??? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????
reliance on native administrators and tribal leaders 
seems appropriate in a tribal society like Darfur. I think 
this program has the potential to make a useful contri-
bution to security and stability in a region that urgently 
needs peace and development.
However, in practice, this good idea has run into 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ?????????
?????? ? ? ??????????? ??? ????????????? ??????????????????????
very little has been achieved in terms of marking, 
registration and data collection. More work was done 
by UNDP in providing information on the program and 
???? ??????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???
However, if the marking and registration process does 
???? ?????? ??????? ?? ?? ????????? ???????? ????? ?????? ????
expectations raised by the public information and 
awareness campaign will be disappointed.
I do not fully understand why technical problems 
(e.g. a lack of transport for essential supplies) and 
???? ???????????????????? ???????????????? ???????????????
customs authorities to clear computer equipment 
within a reasonable period) took so long to overcome 
that they paralysed the program for several months. 
It seems to me that communication and cooperation 
between the various authorities and organizations 
engaged in the ARM program needs to be intensi-
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
considers this program important, it is hard to see 
why it does not take urgent measures to remove the 
obstacles blocking its progress. I recommend that 
these problems be addressed as soon as possible at 
the highest possible level.
The marking and registration process looks only 
at who is in possession of which weapons. It pays no 
attention to the way weapons are handled, carried, 
stored and used, except to ask native administrators 
to prevent misuse of the weapons. Besides, it pays 
no attention to ammunition, although it is the bullets 
that kill and maim, not the guns. Finally, the people 
engaged in marking and registration do not look at 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
is entirely focused on the arms offered for registration 
and marking. I recommend that ARM include these 
topics in their conversations with native administra-
tors, and try to convince the chiefs to promote the 
safe handling, transport and storing of weapons and 
ammunition, as well their responsible use.
I also recommend that people wanting to legalize 
weapons by registering them in Darfur be increasingly 
required to meet conditions similar to those that a 
??????? ???????? ?? ?? ????????? ?????? ? ?? ????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
Darfur.
Indeed, the authorities tell me that when the 
phase of marking and registration is over, they will 
enforce the Law on Weapons, Ammunition and Explo-
??????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ??? ? ?? ??? ???? ??????? ????
possessors. I think they are right to work towards this 
goal.
For reasons I can also understand, the Govern-
ment of Sudan has promised not to collect weapons 
in Darfur until the communities of the region agree to 
it. This was supposed to reassure people and motivate 
them to register and mark their weaponry.
However, I believe the government needs to explain 
to the people of Darfur how it plans to enforce weapons 
control and yet keep its promise not to collect weapons 
without a general agreement. A clear and convincing 
explanation will enhance the credibility of the ARM 
????????????? ???????????? ????????????? ????
I think the ARM program is a good idea, and can 
make a useful contribution to peace and develop-
ment in Darfur. I hope it will overcome its problems 
and realize its potential. This will require the govern-
ment to act swiftly and decisively to clear away the 
obstacles that are blocking the progress of the program. 
I also hope the government will consider some of my 
recommendations for making the program stronger.
Executive summary 
Dr. Sami Faltas is independent advisor and 
teaches at the University of Groningen, 
the Netherlands.
4Visit to West Darfur
In El Geneina, I conducted interviews with
• Focus groups of women;
• Focus group of male youths;
• Focus group of internally displaced persons (IDPs);
• Mr. Mohamed Hassan, Head of National Security 
and Military Intelligence in West Darfur; 
• ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????
the SDDRC in El Geneina;
• Mr. Abdallah Hamdaan Ballal, Head of the Arms 
Registration Committee;
• Ms. Shiho Akamatsu, UNDP;
• Ms. Mardea Martin-Wiles, UNDP.
Teamwork
I gratefully acknowledge the cooperation I received 
from Sudanese authorities, both in Khartoum and in El 
Geneina. However, my illness on 28 to 29 August1, the 
?????? ???????? ?? ???????????????????????? ??? ???????
the rains all limited my ability to conduct interviews 
and collect information in West Darfur. 
I am particularly grateful for the help I received 
from Dr. Mahmoud Zinelabdin and Mr. Salah Idris of 
SDDRC, their colleagues of the Arms Registration 
and Technical Committee (ARC) in El Geneina, my 
interpreter Mustafa el Tayyeb, Wolf-Christian Paes of 
1 Many thanks to the staff of UNAMID Level I and II Field 
Hospitals.
Introduction
The main purpose of my trip to Sudan (23 August to
1 September 2013) was to study the program to mark 
and register weapons held by tribal communities in 
West Darfur and suggest improvements. I will call this 
program ARM. Another part of my job was to report on 
UNDP’s CSAC program, which is intended to support 
ARM. I received this assignment from the Sudan DDR 
Commission (SDDRC) and the Bonn International 
Center for Conversion (BICC) in Germany. 
Visit to Khartoum
Before leaving for Darfur, I interviewed
• Dr. Mahmoud Zinelabdin, SDDRC
• Mr. Salah Idris, SDDRC
• Brigadier-General Abd el Aziz Malik, 
Criminal Investigation Department, 
Ministry of the Interior
• Mr. Adel Shareef, ICRC
• A senior journalist,
• Professor El Tayyeb, former Director of the
Institute of Peace
• The UNDP DDR team.
I was also able to brief Dr. Mahmoud Zinelabdin 
???? ???? ??? ?? ? ???? ??? ??? ????? ??? ????? ???
return to Khartoum, before my departure for the 
Netherlands.
Community members waiting outside a remote arms registration and marking site at a police station in Sirba. The sheer size of Darfur means that 
many community members wishing to register or mark their weapons have to travel great distances, often at their own expense, a concern that 
frequently surfaced in interviews. West Darfur, June 2013.
5BICC, the staff of the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum, 
and above all Nikhil Acharya of BICC, who was my 
constant companion and adviser.
Although I am responsible for the content of this 
???????? ???????????????????????? ??? ??? ????????????????
opinions, concerns and wishes shared with me by 
people in Sudan and in Germany. In this sense, the 
??????? ??????????????? ?????????????? ??? ?????? ???? ???????
and weak points of the ARM program as seen by the 
people involved, with some observations of my own. 
It contains recommendations mostly based on what 
the people involved in ARM think is needed. Here 
again, I have added a few points of my own.
In the following, I will not often indicate which 
information came from which interview, as some of 
the persons I spoke to asked me not to do this. Instead, 
I will use references like “ARM staff believe…”, “some 
women in the region think…” or “some observers 
feel… .” However, when I quote from documents, I will 
cite the source.
Structure
In the main body of the report, I will follow:
1. The structure, composition and resources avail-
able to the ARC in West Darfur, as well as the 
linkages between the Committee and the state 
government and other national actors.
2. The current approach to the sensitization, regis-
tration, and marking of illicit civilian weapons in 
West Darfur.
3. The perceptions of stakeholders (such as commu-
nity, political and religious leaders) in West Darfur 
vis-à-vis the proposed arms registration process.
4. The linkages between the work of the ARC and 
those of other stakeholders, in particular the 
CSAC and Community Labour Intensive Projects 
(CLIP) of UNDP and the African Union/UN Hybrid 
operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
Author conducting interviews with focus groups of women. West 
Darfur, August 2013.
5. The potential impact of the project on human 
security in West Darfur, as well as whether this 
approach could be replicated in other locations 
in Sudan and beyond.
1. Resources, operations, and problems 
of the ARM team in West Darfur
There are about seven people working on the ARM 
program and based in El Geneina, the capital of 
the State (wilaya) West Darfur. The operational unit, 
headed by Mr. Abdallah Hamdaan Ballal, is referred 
to as the Arms Registration and Marking Tech-
nical Committee (it’s also known as the Technical 
Committee or the Registration Committee). Its job is 
to implement the project, which includes running the 
project from day to day, and dealing with technical 
issues. Its work is linked to that with the Community 
Security and Arms Control (CSAC) program of the 
DDR section at UNDP Sudan. CSAC plays a leading 
role in raising awareness and raising support for arms 
registration and marking in Darfur.
The Technical Committee is overseen by a 
Steering Committee chaired by the governor (wali) of 
the state.
The ARM project began in December 2012 with 
a workshop and consultations in El Geneina with the 
native administration. A large consultative and infor-
mation meeting was held at the hall of the Legislative 
Assembly in El Geneina. In early 2013, several public 
launching events caught the attention of the public 
and, I imagine, raised expectations of improved secu-
rity in the region. These expectations have not yet 
???????????? ????????????????????????????????? ???
Community leaders attend a consultative meeting on the ARM 
process at the Legislative Assembly Hall in Geneina, West Darfur. The 
Sultan on the right wears a traditional scarf denoting his status. Mr. Isa ??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
in the background. December 2012.
6The ARM team approaches the ‘native 
administration’2 to request the cooperation of 
these authorities in registration and marking.
Typically, they would approach the native administra-
tors at the highest levels (sultans or ameers). If indeed 
these leaders decide to cooperate, a delegation from 
the tribe headed by lower chiefs (omdas or sheikhs) 
will accompany tribesmen to the registration site.
The dot-peen or micro-percussion marking 
machine, a Spanish product called Couth MC 2000, 
was provided to the Sudan DDR Commission by the 
Regional Centre on Small Arms in the Great Lakes 
Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States 
(RECSA). With the signing of the Nairobi Protocol in 
2004, 11 Member States of RECSA, including the Sudan, 
committed themselves to marking their national 
stockpiles of small arms and light weapons (SALW). 
The objective of this exercise was to ensure that any 
weapon found on the illicit market could be traced 
back to its original, legal owner through a unique 
identifying code. The participating states viewed this 
measure as an essential precursor to controlling diver-
sion—the ‘unauthorized transfer of arms and ammuni-
tion from the stocks of lawful users to the illicit market’3. 
2 The English term ‘native administrator’ was introduced 
by the British colonial authorities, which relied heavily on 
local rulers, and is still used today. Most of Darfur is di-
vided into dar administrated by native administrators or 
traditional leaders who, in most cases, rule over inhabit-
ants of various ethnic groups. In some cases, the leader 
may belong to a minority group. So, strictly speaking, 
native administrators are neither tribal leaders nor gov-???????? ?????? ???? ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ????????????? ????
Tubiana, 2012.
3 James Bevan. 2008. “Arsenals Adrift: Arms and Ammuni-
tion Diversion.” In Small Arms Survey. Small Arms Survey 
2008: Risk and Resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 42–75. As quoted in Bevan and King, 2013: 13.
?????????? ?????? ??? ??? ???????? ? ?????? ????? ? ???
of the Nairobi Protocol. This stipulates that the parties 
???????????????? ???????????? ??????????????? ? ????? ?
?? ?? ????? ??? ?? ?? ? ????? ?? ??? ???? ?? ? ?????????? ??
of the country of import and the year of import, and 
an individual serial number if the small arm or light 
weapon does not bear one at the time of import so 
that the source of the small arm or light weapon can 
be traced’ (Bevan and King, 2013: 16).
In 2005, the region’s states agreed upon a 
common weapons marking format, which consists of 
a star to denote state-owned weapons in the RECSA 
region, an International Standards Organization (ISO) 
country code and a unique serial number. States 
may also introduce codes that specify the particular 
branch of service or particular unit of the defence or 
security forces (ibid.)
In the same year, the States Parties to the Nairobi 
Protocol further committed themselves to marking 
their entire stocks of SALW by the end of 2008. This 
was an un realistic objective—especially as RECSA did 
not supply the majority of the marking machines until 
2009—but it provided an important impetus for states 
to commence with marking operations (ibid.)
Bevan and King explain that marking the 
weapons, registration and tracing are all essential links 
that must go together if marking and registration is to 
improve weapons control (see Table 1 below). 
As we will see, Bevan and King also review lessons 
learned in other RECSA countries about the use, trans-
port and maintenance of the marking machine.
In West Darfur, weapons are supposed to be regis-
tered at local sites throughout the state where holders 
of weapons can be convened. 
However, due to various challenges posed by 
transport, security and maintenance, this often proves 
impossible. On some occasions, tribesmen were asked 
to travel for hundreds of kilometers in order to get their 
Couth MC2000 marking machine in operation on the Sudanese-
Chadian border. Sirba, June 2013.
Community members entering a remote arms registration and 
marking site at a police station in Sirba. Mr. Dakdak, a senior commu-
nity leader, can be seen wearing a white turban, second from right.
7weapons registered and marked in El Geneina. The 
ARM team does attempt to go to locations outside 
the state capital, but during a trip to Kulbus in the north 
of the wilaya, the marking machine lost some of its 
lubricant in transport. This minor technical hitch devel-
oped into a serious problem because for months, no 
effective action was taken to restore the machine to 
working order. 
Apparently, the machine uses a lubricant that is 
not available locally. The ARM team requested a new 
supply of lubricant from Khartoum. However, the item 
was stuck for months at Khartoum airport, for lack of 
transport. In late August 2013 I was told that commer-
cial airlines refused to carry it for safety reasons. I 
was also told the lack of lubricant had brought the 
marking and registration process to a standstill. After 
some 135 weapons had been marked in May/June, 
no marking and registration took place throughout 
the summer and autumn. In September, no one knew 
when the lubricant would arrive in El Geneina.
The ARM team also did not know how large the 
quantity they would receive was, and how long it 
would allow the marking machine to operate.
Yet, by early December 2013, this problem had 
apparently been resolved, and registration had 
resumed (Ballal, 2013).
In their April 2013 study on marking weapons in 
the Member States of RECSA, Bevan and King had 
reported that the Couth MC 2000 is an adequately 
rugged machine, but can nevertheless suffer damage 
if transported unboxed on untarred roads in the back 
of a pickup truck. To prevent this from happening, 
South Africa developed special boxes for use in trans-
port (Bevan and King 2013: 26).
Another operational problem that the ARM 
project suffered in West Darfur was the lack of 
computers and electronic equipment for record-
keeping and communication. A load of equipment 
sent from Germany to Sudan by BICC was stuck in 
????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
cially handed over to the Sudanese DDR Commission 
in October 2013, after a long delay.
Furthermore, the procedures for handling the 
data leave much to be desired. The sensitive data 
being collected is not being adequately backed up. 
BICC technical advisors have tried to do this, but it 
needs to be undertaken systematically.
?????? ???? ?? ?? ?????? ? ???? ????? ??? ? ?????????
of accurate and systematic record-keeping, as well 
as the need for electronic systems that allow law 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
base throughout the country and region (ibid.: 33 ff).
Source: Bevan and King, 2013; Table 2.
Table 1: Assessment criteria.
8Staff conducting the arms registration and marking process prepare 
arms registration cards to record the details of participating community 
members. Sirba, West Darfur, June 2013.
Status of the project according to the ARM team
In a status report dated 4 December 2013, the Arms 
Registration and Marking Technical Committee 
??????????????? ??????????????????????????? ??
• 282 weapons were marked, of which 200 in El 
Geneina;
• 2,500 weapons were registered4; 
• Expenditure for running costs totalled 52,540 
Sudanese pounds, about 8,750 euros;
• The performance of the project was “very weak”;
• Administratively, the project lacked regular meet-
? ???? ??????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??
up on the remote areas;
• Arms registration forms were distributed and many 
weapons were registered, but not marked5; 
• The marking machine should be guarded better, 
because it could be targeted by armed groups in 
the insecure areas;
• The registration process stopped for reasons 
related to the agricultural season (all families 
moved to their farms);
• ??? ??? ?? ?? ???? ?????? ?? ? ? ???? ?????? ????? ?????
stopped registration;
• The armed movements that signed peace agree-
ments with the government have large arsenals 
of weapons, but are not included in the arms 
registration and marking program;
• Upheavals in Egypt and Libya led to increased 
?? ??????????? ?? ? ???????????????????????? ??????
higher prices for weapons;
• A weapon that is very popular and widely spread 
is referred to as ‘Shania’6. People have little inhibi-
tions about it. Ammunition is easy to get;
• Nomads move from north to south in October. 
This is an opportunity to mark and register their 
weapons.
The status report singles out some things that favored 
the ARM project:
• Awareness activities did indeed encourage 
people to cooperate;
• The prices of weapons are rising. For instance, 
a Kalashnikov went from 4,000 to 12,000 Suda-
nese pounds. This, the report claims, led to lower 
demand7; 
4 It follows that 2,218 of the registered weapons were not 
marked.
5 The report says ‘not collected’, which may be an erroneous 
translation.
6 I do not know which weapon this refers to.
7 It seems more likely to me that the price has risen be-
cause fewer weapons are offered for sale.
• The joint Sudanese–Chadian border patrols 
?????????????? ?? ????????? ????????????????? ?? ? ?
the border region;
• Better weapons control on the Chadian side of 
the border had the same effect;
• The suffering caused by the use of guns has 
changed some people’s attitudes regarding the 
possession and carrying of guns;
• The IT equipment delivered to the project: a 
laptop, three desktop computers, one generator, 
a video camera, a photo camera and a video 
project.
The status report goes on to report the following 
problems:
• Progress in registration and marking is “very slow”;
• Habilla, Forbaranga and other areas have not 
begun registration yet;
• ???? ????? ? ??? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ? ?? ??? ????
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????
• The weapons held by movements that signed a 
peace agreement with the government are not 
included in the project.
A soldier wears the insignia of the Joint Sudanese-Chadian Border 
Forces or Force Mixte on patrol outside Bir Saliba, West Darfur. 
June 2013
9Finally, the ARM team presents some challenges 
and recommendations: 
• There is a serious lack of funds. The project needs 
an appropriate budget. For instance, it has so far 
been unable to pay for registration forms;
• It also needs an appropriate vehicle for regis-
tration and marking. At present, the technical 
committee does not have its own car;
• The technical committee also needs additional 
expert members;
• It also needs separate premises;
• It needs more guards to secure the marking 
machine during transport.
This leads me to the following observations:
1. ??? ???? ?????? ???? ??????? ??? ???? ????????? ????? ????
weapons were marked and registered. By the 
??????? ?????????????? ?????? ?????? ???????????????
registered, of which only 282, some 11 percent, 
had been marked. The ARM team is right to call 
this a very weak performance. If a weapon has 
been registered, but not marked, law enforce-
?????????????? ????????????????? ?????????????????????
on site. In terms of weapons control, registration 
only it is not very useful.
2. The severe lack of progress was partly due to the 
lack of transport for essential materials and the 
failure of Customs authorities to clear equipment 
for ARM within a reasonable period of time.
3. The complete lack of activity between June and 
October 2013, and the low level of activity at 
other times, however, is also due to inadequate 
support by the Sudanese government. If they had 
wanted to, government authorities could have 
quickly resolved issues like the lack of lubricant 
and the delay of IT equipment at customs. Also, 
if it considered the project important enough, the 
Sudanese government would give the ARM team 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
??????????????????????????????? ??? ???????? ??
tion and cooperation between the SDDRC, the 
Ministry of the Interior, and other government 
agencies. I recommend that the President’s 
???????? ???????????????????????? ? ?????????????????
cies to actively support this project and provide 
the project staff with the means to do a good 
job. This includes providing operating funds to 
the ARM team working on the ground. The aid 
that Germany provides does not, and was never 
intended to, cover such expenses. BICC’s role is 
to provide capacity development, technical and 
??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????? ???????????? ????????????? ???
4. If the structural problems mentioned above are 
not tackled and resolved as a matter of urgency, 
the next year of the program will be no more 
??????????????????????????
5. To prevent future problems, the people involved 
in the execution of the ARM program also need 
to communicate better with each other. I cannot 
be sure, but I suspect the responsible authori-
ties in Khartoum knew of the problem with the 
marking machine before we told them about it 
on 31 August 2013. BICC and its technical advisers 
????? ??????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ????? ??? ????
they known, they would have tried to help get 
the urgently needed lubricant for the marking 
machine to El Geneina. In the event, they and 
I heard on 30 August that the marking machine 
was not been operational. We received this 
information not from the ARM team directly, but 
???????????????????????? ?? ? ? ???????? ?????? ???
not involved in the technical work of ARM. When 
we asked the ARM team, we found out that 
the machine had not been in working order for 
months.
I realize that carrying out a program in a place like 
????????????????????????? ???? ????????????????????????
tions, a program like ARM cannot avoid suffering 
operational problems from time to time. However, 
good communication and cooperation between all 
??????????????? ???????????????????????? ????????????
lyzing the program for months on end.
2. Security through marking and 
registration? The ARM approach 
???????????? ???? ????? ???????????? ???????? ?????? ??
???? ?????? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ?? ????? ? ?????????
and linked to the persons or organizations allowed to 
have them. This means that both the arms and their 
???????????????? ??????? ??? ???? ???? ?? ? ?????????? ??
?????? ??? ? ?????????? ??? ???? ???? ?????? ????? ??? ???
?????? ?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
which weapons.
It is easy to mark and register a weapon. It is less 
easy to do this consistently, comprehensively and in 
????????????????? ???????????????????? ??? ? ????????
locations can quickly check the legal status of a 
weapon. Besides, the serial numbers provided by arms 
manufacturers are often unreliable. This is why govern-
ments are increasingly marking weapons themselves. 
10
Since 2005, they are obliged under international 
? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
erly marked.
In 2001, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a document with a long name, referred 
to informally as the Firearms Protocol. It is the only 
legally binding international agreement on small 
arms and entered into force in 2005. The Firearms 
????????? ????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ????? ?????? ?? ????
marked during and after manufacture. In 2005, the 
UN General Assembly also adopted an International 
????? ???????????????????????? ???????????????? ??????
??? ??????? ????????? ??????? ????????????? ???????
arms, but is not legally binding (SAS, 2010: 1-2)..
Thus the Arms Registration and Marking initiative 
in the Sudan serves to bring the state into compliance 
with the UN Firearms Protocol of 2001.
According to a Concept Paper of the Sudanese 
government on the ARM program dated January 
2013, 
The general purpose [of the ARM program] 
is to contribute to improving the security 
and stability and to the reduction of armed 
violence in West Darfur through the imple-
mentation of control measures against the 
proliferation and misuse of small arms and light 
weapons and the promotion of social and 
economic development of its population.
?????????????????????????????????????? ?? ???????
1. To launch a process of SALW registration 
and marking owned by civilians through 
the civil and traditional administration, 
facilitating the tracing of arms in the area.
2. To collect basic information and data on 
the movement of arms (numbers, sources 
and locations) through the previous step.
3. To raise community awareness8 on the 
dangers of the spread of illegal weapons 
and its negative consequences for phys-
ical integrity and property (Government of 
Sudan, 2013:3). 
???????????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????????
the responsibility of the ARM program executed by 
the SDDRC. The third is mostly the work of UNDP, and is 
????????????? ???????????????? ???? ??????? ???? ?? ???
responsible for promoting social and economic devel-
opment in West Darfur, which is part of the general 
objective quoted above. Thus UNDP is an essential 
partner. The SDDRC is responsible for bridging and 
coordinating the efforts of the various organizations 
involved in ARM.
In a different way, BICC is also important to 
the success of ARM. Drawing on its knowledge of 
weapons control acquired in other parts of Africa 
and the world, BICC is providing critical expertise to 
??????????? ?????????????????????? ??????? ???????????
where. To a limited extent, the German government is 
????? ? ????????????? ???????????? ???????????????
cial support. However, as I pointed out above, neither 
BICC nor the German government has assumed any 
responsibility for the running of the program.
I do not believe that marking and registering 
weapons held by tribesmen will on its own contribute 
to security, stability and the prevention of armed 
violence in the region. This technical-administrative 
work of marking the guns and registering them and 
their owners will only have a useful political and social 
impact if it takes place in a favorable environment
8 It is not always clear what the community should be 
made of. As I explain below, ARM’s messages some-
times are (or seem) mixed. For instance, the authorities 
promise they will at some point remove surplus weapons 
from the region, but reassure gun owners that they will 
not do this without the agreement of the ‘communities’. 
Furthermore, there are no messages on safe handling 
and storage.
????? ????? ??? ?????????? ??????????????? ???????????????????
M1951 model 9mm pistol. Criminal Investigation Department, Ministry 
of  Interior,  Khartoum, Sudan, June 2013.
Couth MC2000 marking machine in operation on the Sudanese-
Chadian border. Sirba/ Saleeba, June 2013
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and is accompanied by supporting measures. In isola-
tion ARM will do nothing to improve the security of 
people in Darfur.
The practitioners engaged in ARM are aware of 
this. They deliberately chose to work with and through 
???? ??????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????????? ?? ? ?????? ???
?????? ??? ??? ?????????????? ??? ???????????? ? ????
ence the men holding the guns. They included in 
the program various activities to alert the popula-
?? ?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
UNDP and its implementing partner the Sudanese 
NGO Mammen. Finally, they have also sought and 
obtained the help of UNDP in promoting social and 
economic development in the region.
Can this approach, if it is put into practice effec-
tively, contribute to stability, security and the preven-
tion of armed violence in West Darfur? I believe it has 
the potential to do so. I think the ARM approach is 
??? ?????? ??? ? ???? ??? ???????? ??? ?????? ????? ???????
controlling weapons, improving security, building 
????? ? ??????????? ???? ??????? ?? ????????? ?? ?? ? ?
Darfur, a region torn by tribal and political violence. 
In my opinion, the success of this approach needs to 
be measured not merely by the number of weapons 
marked and registered, but even more by the degree 
to which the people of West Darfur are safer and feel 
safer as a result of ARM. 
I see no reason why it could not also be applied 
successfully under similar conditions in other post-
?????? ?? ???? ???? ?????? ???? ? ? ??? ??? ???? ?? ?? ?????
Section 5). Indeed, I hope this idea will be put into 
practice in such a way that it realizes its full potential. 
In this report, I will argue that the ARM program in West 
Darfur is not realizing its potential today. I hope the 
recommendations I make in this report will help make it 
more effective.
2.1 ARM’s strong and weak points
The ARM approach as applied in West Darfur has 
strong points that favor its success and weak points 
that prevent it from achieving its full potential. 
2.1.1 Local ownership by the Sudanese authorities
ARM is a program owned, run, and executed by the 
Sudanese government. This ‘local ownership’ is a 
strong point, especially as in the case of ARM, in some 
cases local community groups are brought into the 
program and share in its ownership. To be sure, ARM 
????? ???????? ???????????? ? ??????????? ?? ???????
While the support provided by Germany (via 
BICC) and UNDP is essential to the success of ARM, 
local ownership is clear and important. First, we must 
assume that the Sudanese know best what their 
country needs. They also know better than outsiders 
what will work in their country. 
Second, local ownership suggests to the popula-
tion of Darfur and Sudan, as well as the international 
community, that the Sudanese authorities are serious 
?????? ??? ?? ?? ?????? ???? ?????????? ??? ????? ?????? ??
ridden region. This is a welcome signal, an eagerly 
awaited one. But to be effective, it must be true, and it 
must be believed. It will only be believed if the people 
Darfur see for themselves that the Sudanese govern-
ment has stopped giving arms, money and encour-
?????????????????? ???????? ?????????? ????????? ????????
will lend credibility to the ARM program, build public 
??????????? ? ? ???? ????????? ? ??? ???????? ????????? ???
my opinion, it is only then that the ARM approach can 
succeed.
Senior community leader DakDak supervises and facilitates the 
participation of community members at each stage of  the arms 
registration and marking  process. Sirba, West Darfur, June 2013.
Male community leaders in a preparatory meeting. Assembly Hall, 
Geneina, West Darfur, December 2012.
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Community members develop traditional coping mechanisms to deal 
with living in an insecure environment. The woman on the left wears a 
distinctive amulet called a ‘hijab’ as a necklace. The amulets, often 
consisting of verses of the Koran pressed into a leather pouch, are 
believed to protect the wearer from violence. Bir Saliba, West Darfur. 
June 2013.
Third, local ownership suggests that the ARM effort 
will be continued even if foreign assistance comes to 
??? ????? ???? ?? ?????? ?????? ??? ??? ? ??? ????? ????????
being asked. They added that they hoped the Suda-
nese government would put some of its own money 
into the program. I think this is very desirable, espe-
cially as the ARM team in El Geneina has no funds 
for running expenses. It relies on the police and other 
government agencies, which are chronically short of 
cash themselves. 
It is not clear to me who receives the money (50 
to 100 Sudanese pounds for each weapon to be 
marked and registered) paid by tribesmen partici-
???? ?? ? ?????? ??????????? ???????? ??????? ? ??????? ???
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
money should be used to cover the costs of ARM.
I suspect that the government’s decision to work 
with and through the native administration in Darfur 
was right, and in my view this is another strong point of 
the ARM program. I am not sure who owns (or rather 
possesses) the tribal weapons. I get the impression 
that most are individually held, but we can assume 
????? ???? ??????? ???? ?????????? ???? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ????
ence the way they are kept and used. If they want, 
??????? ???????????????????????? ? ??? ???????????????
tribesmen who hold the weapons, which would be a 
???????? ???????????? ?? ????????????? ?????????? ? ????
ence to better effect. I will explain this shortly.
2.1.2 Progress in security development 
and the rule of law
People are not safe, and do not feel safe, in West 
Darfur. As government authorities freely admitted 
to me, the peace is fragile. Many efforts are being 
made to make it hold, but no one knows if they will 
succeed. There are outbreaks of violence between 
tribes, families and individuals. Armed violence erupts 
from time to time over the mining of gold. Armed 
robbery, car-jacking, kidnapping and the deliberate 
targeting of humanitarian and peacekeeping staff 
???? ??????????????? ?? ????????? ? ????????? ??????????
many complaints of sexual violence against women, 
girls and boys. All these are serious security concerns. 
So the security situation is bad. But it is better 
than it was some years ago, and it is improving 
further. Relations between Chad and Sudan have 
warmed in recent years. The Chadian–Sudanese 
joint border patrols have achieved a reduction in 
cross-border crime. They have also helped to rebuild 
and restart schools and health centers in the border 
region. Another much-appreciated initiative was the 
re-opening of the market in the Sudanese border 
town Beer Saleba. As a result, people in the border 
???? ??????? ? ??????????????????????????? ??? ? ??????????
A UK-supported community policing project 
has improved relations between the police and the 
community and raised the quality of policing. I am 
told that people are now less suspicious of the police. 
However, I am also told that people do not go to the 
police for help. This suggests that they do not fully trust 
the police yet.
There are also various efforts to improve the judi-
ciary in West Darfur, supported by UNDP and the 
donors. They focus on opening new courts, including 
one specially for women and gender-related cases, 
improving the prisons and rehabilitating ex-convicts, 
raising the quality of the prosecution service and facil-
itating the access to free legal aid.
Sun-dried tomatoes being sold at the market in Bir Saliba on the 
Chadian-Sudanese border. June 2013. The market serves as a hub 
for producers in the region. The Sudanese-Chadian Joint Forces are 
cited as being responsible for creating conditions of security that 
allowed the revival of this market.
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Finally, there is a wide range of development 
programs. Some of these focus on livelihoods, 
empowering women, improving access to clean 
water and other classical development tasks. Others 
have a direct bearing on security. One of these is a 
midwifery project that reduces the risks that women 
face in childbirth, for instance unsafe travel. Another
??? ???????? ??????????????????????????? ???? ?? ????
risk of sexual assault. Yet others, run by UNDP and 
UNAMID, are deliberately targeted at creating an 
enabling environment for the Arms Registration and 
Marking (ARM) program. This applies to the UNAMID-
run Community Labor Intensive Projects (CLIP), which 
offer young men an opportunity to develop voca-
tional skills, and, it is hoped, encourage them to turn 
their backs on a life of violence. CLIP projects for 
women are few. It applies even more to the Commu-
nity Security and Arms Control (CSAC) projects, which 
? ??? ?????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????
the need to legalize such weapons. These CSAC proj-
ects are intended to directly support ARM. They do 
this by linking community development and commu-
nity security with weapons control.
Discussions with focus groups and individual citi-
zens suggest to me that people in West Darfur are 
aware of these improvements, appreciate them 
and are increasingly inclined to cooperate with the 
authorities. 
In other words, West Darfur still suffers from insecu-
rity and underdevelopment, but improvements in both 
areas are creating a better environment for weapons 
control and peace building.9 These are strong points.
9 An expert on arms and ammunition working in the 
region told me that the street price for illegal pistols is 
??????? ???????? ??? ???? ???? ???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ? ???? ??????????????????? ??????????????
2.1.3 Safe handling, secure storage
and responsible use
The ARM program focuses narrowly on the possession 
of weapons. In the marking and registration process, 
it documents who has which weapon. I would recom-
mend that it also look at the ways weapons are 
????? ??? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ??? ? ????
ence them. 
At the moment, these critical issues are getting 
little attention. The Director of the SDDRC says that 
native administrators must guarantee that the arms 
being registered and marked will not be misused.10
????????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????? ?? ? ?
the public information and awareness activities it carries 
out in support of ARM. This is welcome, but not enough 
in my opinion. 
As far as I can tell, the ARM staff in West Darfur 
?????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ???????
their tribesmen to store the weapons safely. They do 
not tell them not to let unauthorized persons carry or 
use the weapons. Nor do they require a promise that 
the weapons will only be used for legitimate defense.
From what I have learned, they also do not 
??????????? ???? ???? ?? ??? ???????? ??? ????? ??? ????
other celebrations. This is common in the Sudan. Stray 
and falling bullets can, depending on the trajectory 
and the type of the round, cause serious uninten-
tional injuries and deaths.11 To have a greater impact 
on security and the reduction of armed violence, 
I would advise that ARM pay more attention to the 
way weapons are stored, moved and used.
The Director of the SDDRC says that in South 
Darfur, where some 8,300 SALW were registered and 
marked, none of these weapons were later found 
to have been used in crimes. He also claims that this 
proves that registration and marking have improved 
public security.12
In my opinion, these claims are highly dubious. If, 
as insiders report, heads of households in Darfur have 
more than one weapon, we must assume that many 
weapons have not been registered. It also seems 
unlikely that people engaging in criminal violence 
would use a registered weapon, if they have the 
alternative of using an unregistered weapon. Finally, 
the only way to establish beyond reasonable doubt 
to obtain. It also suggests that security is better than in 
East Darfur. I suspect it is also better than it was a few 
years ago in West Darfur.
10? ??????? ???????? ??????????????
11? ???? ????? ??? ??????????? ???? ?????? ? ? ? ?? ?? ???? ????
cussed in the Small Arms Survey 2012, chapter 3. 
Geneva, Small Arms Survey, 2013.
12? ??????? ???????? ??????????????
Community members bringing their daughter to a clinic established 
and run by the Joint Sudanese-Chadian Border Forces or Force Mixte. 
Bir Saliba, West Darfur, June 2013.
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whether a particular gun was used in an act of 
violence is forensic testing carried out on the weapon. 
However, forensic testing is not available in Darfur.
2.1.4 Data collection
If I am not mistaken, the ARM team does not really 
use the process of registration and marking to “collect 
basic information and data on the movement of 
arms (numbers, sources and locations)” (GoS, 2013) 
although it is supposed to do so. They only collect 
informa-tion on the weapons they mark and register, 
and the people holding these weapons. As far as I 
can tell, they do not make a habit of asking the native 
administration about the total stock of weapons held 
by the tribesmen in their region, where these weapons 
come from, where they are stored, and what the 
tribe does with them. Consequently, such data is not 
recorded and stored. I am told that such questions 
are pointless because native administrators will often 
refuse to answer or provide incorrect information. 
Nevertheless, I think the questions should be asked. 
There seems to be some confusion about the 
data that ARM is producing. A well-informed govern-
??????????? ????? ????????????????????? ??????????? ??
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
many weapons are out there and who has them. This 
is not correct. ARM only produces information on the 
weapons that tribes submit for marking and registra-
tion. Worse, as the status report of the ARM Tech-
nical Committee cited in Section 1 above points out, 
the large arsenals held by armed groups who have 
signed a peace agreement with the government are 
completely disregarded by ARM.
For its part, UNDP is working on a baseline study on 
SALW in Darfur. The results are not yet available, but I 
am told they will be soon.
2.1.5 Ammunition
I would also advise the ARM program to look at issues 
of ammunition. It is not the weapon that kills, but the 
bullet. Besides, stocks of ammunition are a better 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
is why information on ammunition stocks is considered 
more sensitive than information on weapons. While I 
??????????? ????? ??? ??? ?????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????
again, I think the question should be asked. Besides, 
I think ARM should make an effort to control the 
amount of ammunition in active use. It should try to 
limit the amount of ammunition a person holding an 
ARM Identity (ID) Card is authorized to have in his 
???????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ?? ?? ?????? ???
(see 2.1.6).
2.1.6 Conditions for legalization
More generally, it seems a missed opportunity that 
(apart from asking native administrators to guar-
antee that registered weapons will not be misused 
and charging a registration fee of some 60 Sudanese 
pounds) the ARM program, when legalizing weapons, 
does not impose any conditions on the carrying, 
the storage and the use of the weapons, nor on the 
amount of ammunition the holder is allowed to have 
for use with the weapon. 
A soldier from the Joint Sudan-Chad Border Patrol Force keeps watch 
from on top of a LandCruiser while on patrol in Bir Saliba, West Darfur, 
June 2013.
Children in West Darfur hold up rounds of ammunition they found 
while playing. The current arms registration and marking proces does 
not take ammunition into account. Outskirts of El Geneina, West 
Darfur, August 2013.
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???? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ??????? ??? ???? ?????????
government do impose such conditions (see 2.2.3). 
I think the Sudanese government would do well to 
?????????? ????? ??????? ???? ????? ?????? ?? ??? ?????? ?
possession in Darfur, so that at some point in the 
???????? ????????????? ??? ? ???? ??????????? ??? ?????? ?
is to apply for a government licence. As ARM works 
towards this goal, it seems necessary in my view to not 
only register and mark weapons, but also to require 
from registered possessors of weapons that they 
carry, store and use the weapons safely and respon-
sibly. These requirements can be made stricter as the 
program progresses.
2.2 The impact of the ARM program
I argued above that registration and marking tribal 
weapons will not contribute to security, stability and 
the prevention of armed violence if nothing else 
happens. As we have seen, other things are in fact 
happening, and several of them increase the chance 
that ARM will make a positive difference. I will mention 
several settings in which ARM can be useful and ask 
myself whether it is indeed realizing this potential.
2.2.1 Relations with countries of the region
Like the war between North and South Sudan, the 
wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the 
?????? ??? ???????????? ??????????? ????????????? ???
??????????? ????? ??? ? ?????? ??? ????????? ??????? ????
connections. Relations between Chad and Sudan, 
which had been good, deteriorated into a situation 
in which each country was supporting armed move-
?????????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????????
????????? ????? ??????? ??????????? ?????? ?????? ???? ?? ??
proxy war.
Consequently, it will be very hard, if not impos-
sible, to bring durable peace to Darfur without at the 
same time improving relations between Khartoum 
and Ndjamena. As I said earlier, these relations are 
indeed improving. The most visible evidence is the 
introduction of joint border patrols, which I am told 
are making a real contribution to improved secu-
rity and cooperation in the border zones of the two 
neighboring countries.
Besides, there is a wider cooperation between 
countries of the region. On 23 May 2012, the govern-
ments of Sudan, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 
Republic of Libya signed the Khartoum Declaration, 
in which they agreed to work together to combat the 
proliferation and misuse of SALW. South Sudan is not a 
member of this cooperative venture, which is regret-
???? ?? ?? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ???????? ?????? ???? ??????
?????? ? ????????? ?????????? ?? ? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ?
tions between North and South Sudan ( independent 
?? ??????????????????? ??????? ???????????????13
This growing regional cooperation is an environ-
ment that favours the ARM program in West Darfur. By 
the same token, the ARM program is likely to contribute 
to growing cooperation amongst the states of region 
in the combat against SALW violence. I hope South 
Sudan will join this cooperation before long.
2.2.2 Peaceful relations between tribes 
and communities
The Darfur war was mostly fought between tribes and 
armed movements associated with tribal commu-
nities. However, behind them stood sponsors who 
provided weapons, ammunition, money, encourage-
ment, and sometimes uniforms and military training. 
Today, the main sponsors, especially governments, 
have reduced or ended their support for irregular 
?????? ?? ??????? ? ? ???????? ??? ????? ?????? ?? ?? ?? ??????
chance for peace. If external sponsorship for armed 
tribes and movements in Darfur comes to an end, and 
13 In a positive development since the writing of this report, ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????
Meeting of Experts of the Khartoum Declaration or the 
Sub-Regional Mechanism on Arms Control in Khartoum 
on 26 to 27 November 2013 as an observer state. Senior 
arms control experts representing South Sudan at the 
meeting expressed their deep commitment to convinc-
ing their government to deepen their engagement with 
this process.
R??????????????? ??? ????? ??????? ?? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?? ???? ?????? ?????
DRC, Sudan as well as South Sudan (as an observer state) attended ???? ?????? ???? ???? ????????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????????
on Arms Control. Khartoum, 26-27 November 2013. Corinthia Hotel, 
Khartoum, November 2013.
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is seen to have ended by the population, this will be 
an essential condition for building a durable peace in 
????????????????? ?????????????? ?????????????????????
this development, and help to sustain it. But if external 
sponsors were to go back to arming tribes and move-
ments in Darfur, this could undermine the credibility 
and success of ARM.
The way ARM operates, asking and encouraging 
native administrators to come forward and legalize 
at least some of the weapons held by their tribesmen 
(and, I am told, some women of the tribe), can also 
help to cement peaceful relations between rival 
groups. If two tribal leaders who are rivals, and former 
enemies, both engage in the ARM process, this may 
????? ??? ? ??? ???? ? ??????????? ???? ???????? ?? ? ???
clashes between them.
The presence of gold reserves in Darfur, including 
West Darfur, can either be a blessing or a curse for the 
people of the region. If responsible governance and 
the rule of law prevail in the extraction and selling of 
the ore, the revenues can fuel sustainable develop-
ment in the region, as is the case in Ghana. However, 
if mining is controlled by armed criminal gangs who 
illegally sell the ore, perhaps in collusion with corrupt 
??????????? ?????? ???? ??? ??? ???? ????? ? ? ???? ??????
east of the DRC, then gold reserves could give rise 
to resource wars. By the same logic, disputes about 
cattle, pasture, access to water and other important 
natural resources can potentially develop into armed 
?????? ???
ARM does not deal with armed political move-
ments that are not under the command of the native 
administration. I am told that these are not present in 
West Darfur, or only in small numbers. We should bear 
in mind that ARM cannot reach, and does nothing 
to control, the weapons held by these movements. 
This is a built-in limitation of the ARM approach. Of 
course, it is open to question whether ARM is the right 
context in which to deal with the stockpiles of these 
groups. The more appropriate context is perhaps the 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
program run by SDDRC, UNAMID and UNDP. The 
critical issue is that the arsenals left behind after the 
Darfur need to be dismantled in one way or another.
2.2.3 Weapons control by the state
Modern states generally want to tightly control the 
???????? ?? ???? ???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????
designed for military use, and their ammunition. Like 
most other states, Sudan has a law and a procedure 
?????????? ???? ??????????? ??????????????????? ????????
???? ???????????? ????????? ? ???????????
According to the Law on Weapons, Ammuni-
?? ?????? ???? ????????? ????? ????????? ? ? ??????? ?????
arms may be held for three purposes, sports, hunting 
and self-defence only. The conditions for obtaining a 
licence are:
1. The applicant must be 30 years or older;
2. The applicant may have no prior convictions and 
no record of criminal violence;
3. ???? ????? ???? ????? ????? ?? ???? ??? ????????????
that he or she is in good health;
4. The applicant must have undergone training;
5. The weapon must be stored in a safe place;
6. No weapons are allowed in hospitals and other 
public buildings;
7. No use of weapons for other than the ones 
mentioned above;
8. The weapon was sold by an authorized weapons 
dealer or a private person;
9. The licence applies to a maximum of three 
weapons (sometimes six);
10. The licence must be renewed every year;
11. The serial numbers of the weapons are checked 
and recorded; 
12. These days, the weapons are also marked;
13. The name, address and other details of the 
applicant are recorded;
14. If the applicant violates the terms of the licence, it 
????? ?? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ?? ???????????
and sold to someone else, and the offender will 
not receive a licence in the future;14
15. The number of rounds allowed for each weapon 
is limited to 15 in the case of a pistol and 600 in the 
case of a shotgun (hunting weapon).15
The process of arms registration and marking in Darfur 
????? ??????? ?? ???? ?? ????? ?? ???? ???? ???? ??? ??????
14 A bill has been drafted which, if passed, will raise penal-?? ???????? ? ?? ???????????????? ??? ??????? ???????
15 These provisions give rise to many questions that go 
beyond the scope of this report.
T. Dolcetta/Traditional leaders and members of the arms registra-
tion committee (ARC) of South Darfur state in discussion with BICC’s ?????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ????????
Darfur, October 2013.
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which legalizes their possession of the weapon as long 
as their ID Card is valid. When it loses its validity after six 
months, it must be renewed. Without a valid ID of the 
??????????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? ? ?? ?????? ????
weapon is illegal.
SDDRC staff tell me that registration and marking 
?????? ?????? ????? ????????????????????? ???? ?????? ????
????????????????????? ????? ????????????????????? ??????????
the initially planned period of a year (two stages of six 
months). I agree that this will be necessary. For various 
reasons, including the serious operational problems I 
reported above (Section 1), I think only a long-term 
approach can produce useful results. The partners of 
SDDRC, Germany and UNDP, need to be aware of 
this. I would advise them to take a longer view, while 
urging and helping SDDRC to overcome the problems 
that affect the program today.
Certainly, registration and marking can potentially 
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
the government under the Law on Weapons, Ammu-
nition and Explosives. But for this potential to be real-
ized, I think the ARM program needs to do two things: 
First, in my opinion the requirements for registration 
????????? ????????????? ???? ?????????? ?????? ?????
?? ?? ???????????????????????????????? ??? ???? ????????
hardly any conditions are imposed on applicants 
requesting registration, even though this registration in 
practice amounts to legalization. I think the transition 
from registration to licensing needs to be gradual.
Second, the government needs to be clear, 
consistent and sincere about its intention to eventu-
ally collect weapons. I was told that after the phase 
????????????? ?????? ???? ??? ?? ?? ???????????????????
??????????????????????? ???????????????????? ???????
which have not been registered. There is also mention 
of collection, which suggests voluntary collection, of 
?????? ??
I agree that as soon as this is feasible, it is desirable 
for the government to prosecute the illegal possession 
??? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ???????????? ???????? ?? ????
Explosives provides a legal basis for this.
However, it is not at all clear how this can be 
reconciled with the solemn promise (in fact, the 
English word used is ‘guarantee’) given by the Suda-
nese authorities that they will not collect weapons in 
Darfur unless the tribal communities comprehensively 
agree on the need for it. This lack of clarity will surely 
make some people in Darfur suspicious about the 
government’s intentions in registering and marking 
tribal weapons.
My point is not that the government is insincere in 
its commitment to peace and reconciliation in Darfur, 
but that the authorities have not yet explained their 
policy for the longer term clearly and convincingly 
to the people of Darfur. I would recommend that the 
authorities do this as soon and as publicly as possible.
I hope that the Sudan government’s immi-
nent National Action Plan on Small Arms and Light 
Weapons and the Action Plan for Registration, also 
expected soon, will provide this clarity.
2.2.4 Human security
It is considered good practice today to judge the 
effectiveness of security policy by the degree to which 
it provides human security, that is to say freedom 
from danger and freedom from fear, to each man, 
woman and child. For a discussion of the potential 
impact of the ARM programme on human security, 
see Section 5 below.
3. Perceptions of stakeholders
I have already described my impressions of how the 
government of Sudan, SDDRC and the staff of ARM, 
and various vulnerable groups  in West Darfur view the 
program.
Most who are not directly involved in ARM them-
selves take a favorable or skeptical view of it. I did 
not encounter anyone who was against the program, 
but several people seemed doubtful that it would 
amount to anything useful.
Many of the skeptics say, registration and marking 
is not enough, we need the arms to be removed. I 
have argued that the government needs to explain 
clearly and consistently how it plans to do this without 
breaking its promise not to collect weapons without 
the consent of the tribal communities.
?????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????
cial guarantee from the Ministry of the interior stating that no weaons 
will be collected in this phase. Awareness meeting at Legislative 
Assembly Hall, El Geneinna, West Darfur, December 2012.
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??????? ??????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????? ????????????
affected by armed violence, women experience risks differently 
from men- often being vulnerable to sexual violence and rape while ???????? ?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ??? ?? ?????
UNDP’s perceptions and contributions are 
discussed in the next section.
In general, I would recommend that the SDDRC 
review its public information and sensitization activi-
?? ?? ??? ???????? ?? ?? ??????????? ????????? ???? ? ?????
term vision of how marking and registration will pave 
the way for security and reconciliation.
4. Linkages with other activities
We have already seen that there is room for improve-
ment in the communication and collaboration 
between the ARM program and the work of other 
Sudanese government agencies and BICC.
The same applies to communication and coop-
????? ?? ????? ?????? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ?? ? ????? ????
in Khartoum left me in no doubt that they were fully 
committed to supporting the ARM program. They told 
me the government of Sudan has shown an increasing 
political commitment to work toward peace. UNDP 
has already made contributions to ARM by:
• Organizing four workshops (including one in the 
northern area of Kulbus) and a festival to engage 
various stakeholders in the ARM effort;
• Staging plays in various parts of the wilaya that 
??????????????????????????????? ??
• Hiring traditional singers (hakamas), who custom-
arily sing songs of war, to sing of peace and 
reconciliation;
• Using local radio stations (UNAMID radio and 
????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
?????? ???????????? ??
• Distributing posters and brochures;
• Engaging in an SALW baseline assessment of the 
region, expected soon.
Furthermore, as described above, UNDP is carrying 
out various projects to promote development and the 
rule of law in West Darfur.
5. Human security and replicability
Let us now consider to what extent the ARM program 
is contributing to improved human security in West 
Darfur. We will then ask ourselves whether the ARM 
approach could be successfully applied elsewhere.
5.1 Human security
With the help of the ARM team in El Geneina, I was 
able to speak to focus groups of women, male youths 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs). They described 
the security situation as bad, but some of the women 
noted improvements.
The women told us that the security risks they faced 
were war, sexual violence and bad living conditions, 
including bad water. They described the dangers 
???????????? ???? ? ?????????????????????? ????????
wood, and women in the IDP camps standing in line 
forhours in the blazing sun in order to collect rations 
that were not enough to feed their families. They did 
report that they did not hear gunshots as often as some 
years ago.
The women also pointed out that this is a poten-
tially rich region, with fertile land, enough water, 
huge animal resources and gold. Development must 
unlock this potential. Now the region is underdevel-
oped. No more than 15 to 20 percent of the girls go to 
school. The government must take the lead, they said.
The government must also get the weapons under 
control, they told us. Registration must be followed by 
collection. Some of the women stressed the need to 
also get a grip on weapons held by bandits and other 
uncontrolled groups. They complained that they were 
??????????????????????????????? ??? ???????????????????
I noted that although according to the SDDRC 
one of the lessons learned in South Darfur was that 
ARM needed to engage the women, ARM has done 
very little so far in West Darfur to reach out to them. 
By contrast, UNDP’s sensitization campaigns and 
?????? ???????????? ????? ?????? ????????? ???????????
focus on women.
ARM can potentially make a good contribution to 
women’s security in West Darfur. However, even well-
educated and well-connected women know little 
about it.
The male youths we spoke to stressed the need for 
vocational programs, to be carried out at their club, 
to provide a constructive alternative for young men 
who might otherwise lead a life of crime and violence.
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Nothing I have seen so far illustrates the conse-
???????? ??? ???? ?????? ?? ? ? ??????? ??????? ????? ????
following map of Darfur published by the United 
Nations. It marks the camps of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) all over the region. I counted some 77 
in West Darfur alone. The IDPs I met are living in various 
camps in or near El Geneina. I asked them where their 
homes were and why they could not return. They said 
their homes were not far from El Geneina, but they 
had been driven away by Arab attackers who might 
kill them if they returned. They said they themselves 
were from various African tribes. They can sometimes 
receive visitors from home, in the rainy season.
The IDPs painted a desolate picture of life in the 
camps. The available water is bad, and the World 
Food Programme packages of foodstuffs they receive 
are inadequate. Besides, rations have been reduced. 
The inhabitants of the camps used to get blankets 
and shelters, but no more. 
They said that there is no armed violence in the 
camps, and UNAMID provides protection as best it 
can, but outside the camps, the IDPs are often the 
target of criminal violence. Robbers steal their phones 
and their cars. Going to the market is dangerous, but 
when they set up their own market, the government 
demolished it, they say.
None of the people I spoke to in the focus groups 
displayed a good knowledge of the ARM program. 
Those who were aware of it seemed to consider it a 
useful start. I too think this is an appropriate way to 
describe it.
If and when the ARM program starts working 
again, convinces people that the government is 
???? ??????????????? ????????????????? ????????????????
?????? ?? ? ? ???? ???? ???????????? ?????????????????????
to strengthen the rule of law, boost development, 
empower vulnerable groups and promote reconcili-
ation between former enemies, then I expect it will 
make a good contribution to improved human secu-
rity. At the moment it does not have that effect.
5.2 Can it be done elsewhere?
If I am right to think that the ARM approach is poten-
?? ?????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ?????
SALW in West Darfur, then it follows that it could also 
???????????????????????? ?????????????????? ?????? ????????
similar conditions. While I am sure the people of West 
Darfur consider their homeland unique, its weapons-
related problems are not.
In my view, the main characteristics of West Darfur 
with respect to weapons possession and weapons 
control are:
• Darfur is a tribal society. Beyond family, people’s 
allegiance is to their tribe, more than to their 
country. Tribal chiefs and native administra-
tors are among the most effective leaders, and 
generally speaking, they are capable of deter-
mining whether, when and how their tribesmen 
will exercise armed violence. Vendettas are also 
common.
• Darfuri tribes are in many cases nomadic, pasto-
ralist communities, accustomed to defending 
Source: UN Planning Map, HIC Darfur, 2005. Note: Tent symbols represent IDP and refugee camps.
Map 1: IDP camps, HIC Darfur 
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???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
???? ???????????? ???? ??????? ?????? ???? ?? ???? ???
encroachment by grazing animals and their 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
arms.
• The weapons and ammunition held by tribesmen 
??????????? ???????????????????????? ???????????? ???
leaders and/or native administrators.
• Apart from cattle, pastures and water sources, 
there may be other resources that can give rise to 
?? ? ????????????????????? ??????????? ? ??????????????
that can be extracted without much specialized 
equipment.
• The national government is not capable of 
imposing weapons control on the region, at least 
not yet. Large numbers of military-style SALW were 
inserted into Darfur by the government of Sudan 
and other countries that wished to support some 
tribes against others but were unable or unwilling 
????????????? ?? ? ???????????????????? ????????? ???
They were also introduced by nomadic tribes and 
private arms dealers.
• ?? ????????? ?? ???? ????? ??? ??? ????? ???? ?????
??????????? ??????????????? ???????????? ? ? ????
??????????? ???? ???? ??? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???
have not reached a level that makes it feasible to 
run voluntary weapons collection programs.
Under such conditions, the ARM approach may prove 
?? ??????? ?????? ??????? ??? ?????? ???? ??????????? ?? ??? ??????
arms. As I argued above, it should preferably not be 
limited to the issue of weapons possession, but should 
also tackle issues of the unsafe handling, insecure 
?????????????????????? ? ?????????????? ??? ?????????????
misuse of SALW is a greater threat to security than the 
proliferation of these weapons.
As I have also said above, to be effective, the 
????? ?? ???????????? ??????????? ?? ???? ??????? ???
with efforts to promote development, build public 
??????????? ? ? ???? ??????????? ????????? ??????? ????
promote reconciliation between former enemies. The 
targeted community security approach employed by 
UNDP in support of ARM is appropriate and helpful, 
but needs to be linked more strongly to weapons 
control.
The ARM approach could perhaps be repli-
??????? ????? ?????????? ??? ??? ????? ? ???? ??????
tions, in other parts of Darfur and the Sudan, as 
well as in the other states that have signed the
Khartoum Declaration, namely the Central African 
Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and Libya. Unfortunately, South Sudan is not a 
signatory to the Khartoum Declaration yet.
In the Khartoum Declaration of 23 May 2012, 
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ?????? ?
?????? ????????????????? ?????? ????????????????????????
currently establishing a secretariat that will support 
and coordinate their efforts.
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